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IRRATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE BIAS AT A
CLOSING IN ARTHUR SOLMSSEN'S
THE COMFORT LETTER
Richard W. Painter*
INTRODUCTION
In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,' the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") alleged that the directors and officers
of National Student Marketing Corporation ("NSM"), Interstate
National Corp. ("Interstate"), and their lawyers had violated the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.2 Shortly before the
closing of a merger agreement between NSM and Interstate, the
auditors for NSM discovered that NSM's earnings had been
overstated, and hence, the proxy statements used to solicit the
Interstate shareholders' approval of the merger were materially
misleading.3 The lawyers, nonetheless, allowed the merger to go
forward without resoliciting approval from Interstate's shareholders,
and allowed some of Interstate's principals to sell NSM stock they had
acquired in the transaction without disclosing to the buyers the
material changes in NSM's financial statements.' Federal District
Judge Barrington Parker found that the lawyers representing
Interstate aided and abetted the Interstate principals' violation of
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act ("1934 Act") and § 17(a)
of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act ("1933 Act") because the lawyers
had neglected their duty to protest their client's decision to go ahead
with the merger.5 According to Judge Parker, "[t]heir silence was not
only a breach of this duty to speak, but in addition lent the
appearance of legitimacy to the closing."6 Unfortunately, Judge
Parker was less clear about what the lawyers should have done.7
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois School of Law.
1. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
2. Id. at 686-87.
3. Id- at 689, 695.
4. Id. at 696-97.
5. 1& at 715. The attorneys representing NSM had settled before trial similar
SEC charges brought against them. Id. at 687.
6. Id. at 713.
7. Judge Parker stated that "it is unnecessary to determine the precise extent of
their obligations here, since ... they took no steps whatsoever to delay the closing."
Id at 713. One of the most difficult problems in National Student Afarketing is
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Judge Parker thus fired one of the first shots in what has become a
continuing battle over the duties of a lawyer confronted with a client's
securities law violations. This debate over the duties owed by a
lawyer remains hotly contested between the securities bar on the one
hand and the SEC on the other.'
determining what the merging companies' shareholders would have wanted to do had
they known about NSM's actual earnings. Would NSM's shareholders have wanted
to hurry up and close the deal? Would Interstate's shareholders have wanted a
chance to reconsider the merger, knowing that NSM was not as profitable as earlier
thought? Would Interstate's shareholders have believed that they were still getting a
good deal and that resoliciting shareholder approval posed an unacceptable risk that
the merger might be called off? NSM, for example, could try to back out of the deal
while the proxy solicitation was in progress. Alternatively, NSM's stock price could,
before the merger was closed, go up on account of offsetting good news. NSM might
then demand a higher price for the merger. See id. at 694 Thus, even if NSM did not
earn as much profit as its financial statements said it did, Interstate's shareholders
might still prefer to go ahead and close the deal without delay. There is simply no
way of knowing.
Because corporations do not have the ability to solicit decisions about a merger at
the last minute from widely dispersed shareholders, corporate directors are usually
delegated the power to decide whether to close a merger transaction. Unfortunately
for the defendants in National Student Marketing, this power did not extend to closing
the merger if proxy votes approving the merger were obtained in violation of federal
securities laws, particularly when some of the Interstate principals also sold their own
NSM shares without disclosing the inaccuracies in NSM's financial statements to the
buyers. Notwithstanding the possibility that some profitable deals may be lost as a
result of the requirement to re-solicit shareholder approval if defects are discovered
in already distributed proxy materials, the SEC, and presumably the courts, would
agree that registrants' compliance with federal securities disclosure requirements
takes precedence.
8. See Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame
It to Their Will, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1075, 1078-79 (1993) (discussing the conflict
between the bar and regulatory agencies over the duties owed by a lawyer).
Academic literature also debates the wisdom of imposing on lawyers an affirmative
duty to disclose to regulators information which organizational clients are required to
disclose but do not. Some commentators argue that mandating lawyer disclosure
would interfere with the legitimate objectives of legal representation. See Joseph C.
Daly & Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the
SEC, 24 Emory L.J. 747, 748 (1975). Professor Kraakman argues that
"whistleblowing leaves all regulatory targets at the mercy of their private monitors"
and creates for clients "a powerful incentive to withhold information from potential
whistleblowers." Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 60 (1986). Other commentators argue,
however, that "[ulsing lawyers as gatekeepers and whistleblowers is a relatively
inexpensive mechanism to achieve widespread compliance with the law." George H.
Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 637, 718 (1994). The present author has already written extensively on this
subject and will not do so again here. See generally Richard W. Painter, The Moral
Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 507 (1994)
(arguing that lawyers often share responsibility for client conduct in business
transactions); Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services:
In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 221 (1995)
(proposing that lawyers and clients should voluntarily agree ex-ante that the lawyers
will blow the whistle on illegal acts and arguing that this commitment is likely to be
viewed favorably by regulators, transaction participants, and investors); Richard W.
Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a
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Arthur Solmssen's novel, The Comfort Letter,9 is based on National
Student Marketing. This novel is not only an excellent introduction to
the legal and ethical issues in securities practice, but also to the
psychological pressures that bear down on lawyers and clients at a
closing. The novel, like some securities transactions in real life, also
includes a last minute crisis. This crisis might have been avoided had
the lawyers in the story recognized earlier the irrationality and
cognitive biases that affected the decision-making of the participants
in the closing.
Part I of this Article summarizes the story in The Comfort Letter.
Part II briefly mentions how the crisis that arose in that story might
have been avoided had the lawyers better understood how the
motivations and biases of the people in the company they represented
could interfere with the due diligence investigation prior to the
closing. Part III explains how irrationality and cognitive biases can
lead individuals to ignore problems that exist in a company and how
cognitive biases affect a lawyer's ability to evaluate the risks that a
client undertakes. Part IV discusses how compensation arrangements
for lawyers and auditors also can influence professionals' responses to
risk.
I. THE COMFORT LETTER
In The Comfort Letter, Charlie Conroy, President and CEO of
Conroy Concepts Corporation ("CCC"), is planning to acquire
Bromberg Instruments." Bromberg's shareholders have already
approved the merger, and their stock has appreciated considerably
with news of the merger." To obtain financing necessary to pay off
short-term debt and increase working capital, Charlie also plans for
CCC to close a $100 million debenture offering. 2 As required under
§ 5 of the 1933 Act, CCC must register the debentures with the SEC.1 3
The underwriting syndicate, managed by First Hudson Corporation,
insists that before they will close the debenture offering, they must
have a "comfort letter" from the auditing firm, Pennypacker Poole &
Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996) (proposing a default rule requiring a
lawyer to report a corporate client's prospective illegal acts to its full board of
directors unless instructed to do otherwise by the client's articles of organization).
9. Arthur R.G. Solmssen, The Comfort Letter (1975). Substantial portions of
the chapter from The Comfort Letter which is discussed in this article, are included in
John T. Noonan & Richard W. Painter, Professional and Personal Responsibilities of
the Lawyer 123-42 (1997). Arthur R.G. Solmssen was admitted to practice in
Pennsylvania in 1954, and was a partner, and is now of counsel, at Saul, Ewing,
Remick & Saul in Philadelphia, specializing in corporate and municipal securities law.
He is also the author of several novels.
10. See Solnssen, supra note 9, at 158-59.
11. See id. at 298.
12- See id. at 260.
13. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. 1, § 5 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994)).
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Co. (",pp"). 14 This letter is to state that no material changes to CCC's
financial condition have come to the auditors' attention since CCC's
financial statements were prepared and published in the preliminary
prospectus circulated to prospective investors before the date of the
debenture offering.15 Both the merger and the debenture offering
require extensive due diligence by the underwriters and by CCC's
lawyers to ensure that accurate disclosure of all material facts about
the transactions has been made to the merging companies'
shareholders and to the debenture purchasers.
The cast of characters includes: Ordway Smith, the narrator of the
novel and a partner at the law firm of Conyers & Dean in
Philadelphia, which represents CCC in the transaction; Tommy Sharp,
an associate at Conyers & Dean;16 Harry Hatch, a partner of Iselin
Brothers & Devereaux and counsel to First Hudson and the other
underwriters involved in the debentures offering; 7  Bernard
Bromberg, the President and CEO of Bromberg Instruments; Justin
Silverstone, lead counsel for Bromberg Instruments; and Sandy
Simon, co-counsel for Bromberg Instruments.18 The year is 1969.19
Just before the delivery of the comfort letter and closing, a serious
problem emerges. A design defect is discovered at a nearly completed
coal-burning power plant that Darby Turbine, a recently acquired
subsidiary of CCC, has been building at Turkey River for a large
utility company in West Virginia.2  The new, expensive limestone
scrubbers that Darby Turbine installed to bring the coal-burning plant
into conformity with state environmental standards do not work.2'
Neither the proxy statements, used to obtain approval from both
companies' shareholders for the merger, nor the prospectus, given to
the prospective purchasers of the CCC debentures, discloses this
problem and its potential impact on the value of CCC's stock.' The
closing is just days away.
Alex Morrisson, chief engineer of Darby Turbine, claims he warned
CCC about this problem with the limestone scrubbers, but that he was
ignored by the "fancy hotshot atomic energy people" who, despite
their ignorance of coal furnaces, were brought in above him after
CCC acquired Darby Turbine.23  Political tension within Darby
14. See Solmssen, supra note 9, at 266-67.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 20.
17. See id. at 11.
18. See id. at 160. In addition, Hewitt Robinson is President of Darby Turbine,
Jack Renfrew is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of CCC, and
Frank Fonseca ("the Frenchman") is corporate secretary of CCC. See id. at 10, 160,
169,277.
19. See id. at 12.
20. See id. at 277-79.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 280-82, 297.
23. Morrisson says: "[N]obody will listen to what engineering people with forty
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Turbine eventually explodes into hostile accusations when it becomes
clear that a shut down of the Turkey River plant by West Virginia's
environmental authorities may be unavoidable.24 These same internal
political problems probably compromised the due diligence process,
which was supposed to detect problems of this sort before
prospectuses and proxy statements were circulated to investors.25
Now, CCC and its lawyers, accountants, and underwriters face a crisis
on the eve of closing.
The utility company that purchased the defective limestone
scrubbers from Darby Turbine is, understandably, disputing payment
of the contract price-about $170 million.2 Instead of a profit, Darby
Turbine may sustain a substantial loss on the Turkey River contract,
although the exact extent of the loss is unknown. After spending
$200,000 on accounting fees, legal fees, and printing costs, CCC and its
counsel suddenly discover that the prospectus for the sale of the
years in the coal business have to say, they let a kid just out of engineering school call
the shots about building a coal-burning power plant." Id. at 277. The utility company
had specified a full-scale stack gas cleaning system to comply with state
environmental regulations and Darby Turbine filled the order by installing the
limestone injection system and wet scrubbers, despite Mr. Morrisson's warnings that
the system might not work. ld. at 278.
24. Ordway describes the problem with the defective limestone scrubbers:
The fly ash and the limestone slurry tended to form hard cement-like
deposits that clogged the marble beds, clogged the demisters, clogged the
water jets, and clogged the inlets to the scrubbers. They were having so
much trouble that the electric company had just refused to pay the last
installment of the construction contract.
"Can't they operate the plant without the scrubbers?" asked Tommy
Sharp.
Alex Morrisson shook his head. "Ever seen that valley? River's a
hundred yards wide, then there's a railroad track, a highway, a half mile of
bottom land, then mountains straight up on both sides. Unless you get a
wind blowing down the river the smoke will lie in there, there's three little
factory towns strung along that valley, they had to close a chemical plant
because they couldn't get rid of the fumes-"
Id. at 279.
25. The investigating attorneys were unable to uncover the problem at the power
plant being built by Darby:
"My God, we climbed all over that plant," said Tommy Sharp. "The
underwriters were there, the people from Iselin Bros. were there, nobody
said a word about this!"
I didn't like the way he sounded. He sounded frightened, and Tommy
isn't easily frightened.
"Of course they didn't say a word about it." Alex Morrisson was not
frightened at all. On the contrary, he sounded pleased. "This was their baby,
their brilliant idea, Mike Barkus practically invented the scrubbers, you
know-"
"Who's Mike Barkus?" I asked.
"Mike Barkus is a kid six years out of Carnegie Tech, a kid who's going to
show the whole profession how to build coal-fired power plants, a kid who
sold this whole ball of wax to people who know all about atomic energy-"
Id. at 283.
26. See id. at 280.
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debentures, although correct at the time the preliminary prospectus
was circulated, is now wrong.27 Unless changes are made to the
prospectus to disclose these new developments, the accountants will
refuse to deliver their comfort letter confirming that the financials of
CCC and its affiliates, including Darby Turbine, are correct as of the
closing date.' Without the comfort letter, CCC and its officers,
directors, and investment bankers, if they go ahead and close the deal,
are legally responsible for the accuracy of the financial statements in
the prospectus, and may be sued by purchasers of the debentures
under the federal securities laws. 9
Stickering the prospectus to note the change in the financial status
of the company is one solution. Stickering would provide a way to
update prospective debenture purchasers about the situation so that
they could make an informed decision about whether to buy. First
Hudson, the lead underwriter for the debentures transaction,
however, rejects the idea of stickering the prospectus, 30 because once
Darby Turbine's problem is exposed, hesitant buyers could leave the
underwriters holding the debentures in what is known as a "sticky
offering." 31
The Bromberg side of the transaction is even more problematic
because it poses a dilemma for the parties to the merger similar to that
in National Student Marketing:3
"What good would a sticker do you?" asked Tommy [Sharp],
munching. "Even if the underwriters let us sticker their
Prospectuses, what about your Bromberg stockholders? They got
the same financials in their Proxy Statement. Are you going to send
27. See id. at 282.
28. According to John Lundquist, the CPA partner in charge of the auditing firm,
Pennypacker Poole & Co.:
[S]omething happened, you see, a subsequent event that changed the facts.
So in the light of these new facts we obviously can't deliver the same letter
on Tuesday-at least not in the form required by the underwriters. I can't
very well say that nothing has come to my attention that would indicate a
material adverse change in consolidated results of operations ....
Id. at 282.
29. In particular, CCC and its officers, directors, and investment bankers could be
liable under § 11 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). In addition, if intent to
defraud or recklessness can be shown, they may be liable under § 10(b) of the 1934
Act. Id. § 78j(b).
30. See Solmssen, supra note 9, at 296, 322. Underwriters sometimes place a
sticker on the prospectus notifying prospective investors of material changes to the
registrants' financial condition that are discovered after the effective date of the
registration statement.
31. Sticky offerings can also pose regulatory problems for the underwriters. See
generally Daniel J. Winnike & Christopher E. Nordquist, Federal Securities Law
Issues for the Sticky Offering, 48 Bus. Law. 869 (1993) (describing securities law
problems that arise when an underwriter takes part of an unsuccessful offering into its
investment account and later tries to resell the securities).
32. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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them another Proxy Statement, hold another meeting, have them
vote on the merger all over again?"
Sandy [Simon-co-counsel for Bromberg] lighted his pipe,
looking profound. "Mm. We've considered that."
Tommy plowed ahead. "And if you postpone the merger, call
another stockholders' meeting, then our Prospectus is wrong again
because it contains the Bromberg earnings and it says the Bromberg
holders have approved the merger!"
Sandy nodded. "Fortunately, you'll recall the merger agreement
says that Bromberg's officers can waive certain conditions of closing,
if it appears to be in the best interests of Bromberg's stockholders."
That was the first time the word "waive" was heard in the room.
Now Tommy Sharp looked skeptical. "You're going to waive the
comfort letter?"
"Not the whole letter, of course, but perhaps we could work out
some change in the wording ... ." At the other end of the table, the
accountants stopped talking among themselves. Sandy Simon rose
and went over to confer with John Lundquist [CPA and partner in
charge from Pennypacker Poole & Co.].
Tommy Sharp leaned toward my left ear: "I don't know if
Bromberg realizes it, but he's really in something of a box."
"Why?"
"Well look, when the merger was first announced, before it was
announced, Bromberg stock was worth what? Sixteen-seventeen
dollars a share, something like that? But now it's traded as if the
merger's accomplished, and CCC is up, so right now Bromberg stock
is worth about forty. Right?"
"Right."
"So let's say the merger aborts, the merger doesn't take place
because the Bromberg control people-that's Bernard and Bob
[Bromberg]-insist that every technical closing requirement be met,
that the comfort letter says word for word what the merger
agreement requires... so the merger doesn't come off, what
happens? Each and every Bromberg stockholder has a loss of
twenty-three or twenty-four dollars a share. Who are they going to
go after for that loss?"
"Charlie? [Conroy]"
2000] 1117
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"No, not if Charlie was willing to go ahead with the merger.They're going to go after Bernard and Bob, that's what they're going
to do!"'
33
Ordway Smith, the partner in charge of the due diligence being
performed for CCC and Tommy Sharp's supervisor, knows however
that the legal position of the Bromberg principals, if they decline to
resolicit the proxies, is also dubious.' In view of the shakiness of
Bromberg's legal position, and the underwriters' refusal to sticker the
prospectus, Ordway knows he must persuade Charlie to call off the
closing at least until CCC's financial statements can be corrected and
new prospectuses circulated to the debenture purchasers.35 Charlie,
unfortunately, neither understands, nor wants to understand, the
problem:
Charlie Conroy's scowl reflected anger and impatience. "So
what's the big problem?" he finally interrupted. "It's a new concept,
it's going to take some time to make it work, why are we making
such a big deal about it?"
Patiently John Lundquist explained again: percentage-of-
completion method, earnings already taken in might have to be
backed out, adjustments might be required ....
"So what? So we'll make the adjustments! It can't amount to
more than a couple of cents a share .... "
"But you see, the comfort letter requires us to say. ..
Suddenly Charlie exploded: "All right, let's cut out all this
bullshit! What are we going to do? I've got sixty-five million in
bank notes coming due next week. Are you people trying to tell me
you're walking away from this deal on account of some trouble at
one power plant in West Virginia? One project out of two dozen
we've got going all over the world? On account of a possible
adjustment of five cents a share? Is that what you're trying to tell
me? We're going to write off six months of work and two hundred
thousand in expenses and tell the banks, 'Sorry, fellas, our limestone
scrubbers got clogged, you'll have to wait a while!'? And what
about Bernard [Bromberg's] stockholders? They think their stock's
worth forty bucks a share because they're merging with CCC
tomorrow. What are we going to tell them? Now come on, wake
up! We're paying you guys the kind of fees we're paying you
because you're supposed to be the best lawyers, and the best
33. Solmssen, supra note 9, at 297-98.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7 (discussing National Student
Marketing).
35. See Solmssen, supra note 9, at 325.
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accountants and the best investment bankers in the country, and I'm
telling you you'd better come up with the answer!"36
Later, immediately before the scheduled closing, Charlie continues to
be obstinate:
At first [Charlie] didn't understand. "What do you mean you
can't give an opinion? We all agreed it was okay, we'll make the
scrubbers work and if it costs us money we'll adjust the earnings ....
They've all agreed it's okay!"
[Ordway:] "They're kidding themselves, Charlie. It's not okay.
We've either got to put on a sticker to tell people about the
problem, or we can't take their money."
"They won't put on a sticker, you heard them explain that
yesterday!"
"Then we can't close."
The color left his face. "You gotta be kidding."
Eventually, Ordway makes it clear to Charlie that he cannot close
the deal. Their discussion, however, exposes the raw emotion Charlie
has invested in this transaction:
"Ordway, what the hell has gotten into you? You heard the
engineers, they spent all day explaining, they're going to use the
plant, it's just a question of working out some bugs in a new
process-"
"Charlie, I hope to God the scrubbers will work, but that isn't the
point. The point is we've got to tell people we've got a problem.
This is the kind of thing an investor would want to be told, isn't it?
Wouldn't you want to be told? We've somehow talked ourselves
into the position that it's not a big problem, it's not what they call
material-well, that's bullshit, it is material, and both of us know it!"
He stared at me for a long moment. His face changed.
"You're chicken!"
"Aw Charlie!"
"We run into a few problems and the Messrs. Conyers & Dean
develop cold feet. Oh, they don't mind collecting two or three
hundred grand in fees every year, even from the gardener's son-it's
all money, after all-but when we get down to the nitty-gritty, when
the client really has his balls in the wringer, then the Messrs.
Conyers & Dean suddenly develop very high ethics-"
36. Ild. at 301-02.
37. 1l at 322.
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"That's unfair, Charlie! You know we've overcome one hurdle
after another, we've moved heaven and earth for you -"
"For Christ's sake, Harry Hatch thinks it's okay. Are you smarter
than he is? One of the biggest law firms in the world?"
"I think he's wrong. This thing is going to come back to haunt us
all-"
"Sandy Simon thinks it's okay, one of the biggest firms on the
Coast. Are you so much smarter than they are, Ordway? Would you
really call yourself a top-notch lawyer? Or would you call yourself a
guy who's had every goddamned thing in life handed to him on a
silver platter." He was shouting now, his face red. I was thankful the
door was shut, but even so-
"Now wait a minute-"
"Every goddamned thing! While I had to work my ass to the bone
morning, noon and night since I was sixteen years old and I built a
four-hundred-million-dollar company out of nothing. Out of
nothing! A sick old sheet and tube company eighteen months away
from bankruptcy, and I built it all up by myself, and you're supposed
to be my lawyer! Aren't you supposed to be my lawyer?"
"Yes, I am your lawyer."
"You're my lawyer? A lawyer is supposed to help when his client
gets in trouble, isn't he? Here we run into a little flak and it isn't the
other guys' lawyers that shoot me down, it's my own lawyer!"
There was no use arguing with him. He was frantic. I knew it
would be bad but I didn't think it would be this bad. I looked down
at the carpet while he struggled to control himself, breathing heavily.
"House of cards," he said, more quietly, his voice shaking.
"Banks going to move in-"
"We'll work out something with the banks-"
"We'll work out shit!" It came quietly now, through clenched
teeth. "You and I are through, Ordway!"
"I'm sorry."
"Are you? Really? Now that everything is going to hit the fan?
Or are you just as glad to get those fine gentlemen at Conyers &
Dean out of the line of fire?"
"No, I'm as sorry as I've ever been about anything in my life,
Charlie. We could really help you, but you've got to play it our
way."
1120 [Vol. 69
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"Yeah. Play it your way. You know where I'd be today if I always
played it your way? You wouldn't even know me, Ordway!" He was
speaking more quietly now, but his eyes were still wild and he
couldn't catch his breath. "I'm going out there now... and I'm
going to tell them... I'm going to tell them what the great firm of
Conyers & Dean has done to me ... what my own lawyer... has
done to me-"
"Wait a minute, Charlie." I stood up and blocked his way.
We stared into each other's eyes. He was sweating. I thought he
was going to hit me. "If you go out there in this state, you'll really
blow everything. Just look at yourself. What are they going to think
when they see you? The only way to handle this-after you've
calmed down-is to tell them it's your decision: you've decided to
withdraw the issue-on advice of counsel, of course-because of the
Turkey River contract, because you may have to restate your
earnings and you want the investment community to know that
before you put out the Debentures. Honest to God, Charlie, it's the
only way!"
A curtain fell over his eyes. "I need legal advice," he muttered,
turning away from me, opening the door ....
The story ends with Charlie announcing that, on the advice of
counsel, the deal will not go forward.3 9
I. RECOGNIZING PROBLEMS EARLY
While professional responsibility courses often expose students to
difficult decisions in "no win" situations, they sometimes neglect to
emphasize the importance of spotting and preventing problems before
they become crises. The last-minute crisis in The Comfort Letter is an
excellent example of a situation that might have been avoided with
more careful due diligence.40 The problems with Darby Turbine's
limestone scrubbers might have been discovered earlier had the
lawyers understood the motivations and psychology of the people they
interviewed during their investigation of CCC's business. As already
discussed, however, political problems within Darby Turbine made
adequate due diligence difficult.41
A professional responsibility class, in discussing this story, should
focus on what a lawyer representing either the issuer or the
underwriters in due diligence can do to recognize and address
3& Id. at 322-25.
39. See id. at 325-26.
40. Indeed, the entire point of due diligence, in which lawyers for both the issuer
and the underwriters carefully investigate every aspect of the issuer's business, is to
discover and disclose in the preliminary prospectus anything that would be material to
an investor's decision to buy the issuer's securities.
41. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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problems as early as possible. Clearly, it is not enough for lawyers
conducting due diligence simply to know the industrial and financial
aspects of an issuer's business. Businesses are run by people, and a
lawyer should understand the interpersonal dynamics within an
organizational client. As the Conyers & Dean lawyers found out at
Darby Turbine, interpersonal rivalries and employees' personal
investments in particular projects can prevent unbiased information
about hidden risks from reaching the lawyers. Lawyers who
understand an employee's possible motivations to slant his or her
assessment of a project's risks, or even to conceal deliberately
technical problems, will know enough to ask more questions, to verify
information they receive from employees in one part of a company
with employees in another part of the company, and, where prudent,
to call in independent experts. Although due diligence does not
always uncover everything, it can be more effective when lawyers
make an effort to understand the motivations and psychology of the
people who answer due diligence questions, instead of treating on-site
interviews as a mere formality demanded by "due diligence
checklists."
Although due diligence work is often done by junior associates, part
of what the client pays for is a lawyer who, although not yet an
experienced practitioner, has the good judgment to think about the
transaction and the people involved, and to ask tough questions,
instead of merely going through the motions. By asking these tough
questions, lawyers may be able to avoid the last-minute ethical
dilemmas faced by the attorneys in The Comfort Letter.
Even if a lawyer asks the right questions, however, it is sometimes
difficult to respond appropriately to known risk because of the client's
or one's own irrationality, or because of cognitive biases that affect
evaluation of risk. The next part of this Article discusses the ways in
which both irrationality and cognitive biases can affect decision-
making of both lawyers and clients.
III. RECOGNIZING IRRATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE
BIASES
Many of the problems encountered in The Comfort Letter
developed because decision-making was affected by irrationality and
cognitive biases. Learning to anticipate how people's judgment may
be affected by these factors is an important element of evaluating the
problems that may arise at a closing.
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A. The Irrational Client
There is wide debate among economists and legal scholars over
whether a rational actor model accurately predicts human behavior. 2
The underlying issue in this debate is whether decisions that depart
from the rational actor model in a significantly large population
randomly cancel each other out or whether irrationality and cognitive
biases affect human behavior in a systematic manner, leading a
population as a whole to be overly optimistic (and risk-preferring) or
pessimistic (and risk-averse).43
Regardless of whether people in the aggregate behave consistently
with the rational actor model, both sides of this debate readily
acknowledge that people often do not behave rationally.' While the
rational actor model may be a useful tool for discussing how legal
rules affect human behavior generally, it is far less useful for
understanding the behavior of any single person or organization.
Professors do their students a disservice if they rely exclusively on an
unqualified rational actor model in classroom discussion rather than
discussing the real world in which individuals, including lawyers'
clients, are often irrational.
Charlie Conroy is no exception. In the following scene, which takes
place shortly after the defect in Darby Turbine's limestone scrubbers
is discovered, Ordway Smith visits Charlie at his home:
I... marched upstairs. The door to the master apartment was shut. I
knocked. No answer. I knocked again. When I opened the heavy
oak door, I heard the television, Redskins and Dallas Cowboys, but
it was dark as I turned through the dressing room into the master
bedroom, and the smell was stale beer and cigarette smoke. The
curtains were closed and the only light came from the television set.
Charlie slouched in a leather armchair, enormous, dressed in
striped pajamas, black silk kimono, slippers. Around him, empty
beer cans and overflowing ashtrays.
"Are you all right?" I asked, still standing by the door.
42. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551 (1998) (advocating rational actor model); Christine Jolts,
Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and
Kelman, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1593, 1599 (1998) (criticizing rational actor model).
43. See Posner, supra note 42, at 1556-57 (assuming that irrational smokers
respond randomly to an increase in the tax on cigarettes). According to Judge
Posner, "[i]f the distribution of these random behaviors has the same mean as the
rational smokers' reaction to the tax, the effect of the tax on the quantity demanded
of cigarettes will be identical to what it would be if all cigarette consumers were
rational." Id. But see Jolls et al., supra note 42, at 1599 ("[Judge Posner's argument] is
a common response to behavioral economics, and conceivably it could be true; but
there is absolutely no reason to think it is, and (as is usually the case) none is offered
by the source of the criticism."). Irrationality and cognitive biases are two distinct
phenomena which are discussed separately in this article.
44. See Jolts et al., supra note 42, at 1599; Posner, supra note 42, at 1556-57.
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No answer.
I walked in, walked past him, turned off the sound of the
television.
Still no comment.
I pulled one of the curtains just a little bit, so that a beam of
sunlight pierced the smoky darkness.
"Cut that out," Charlie snarled. "The light hurts my eyes."
He rubbed his hands across his face, then looked up angrily. He
hadn't shaved or combed his hair, but he sounded sober.
"Have you got a hangover?" I asked. "What you need is some
coffee and some fresh air."
"What I need is peace and quiet. I slept two hours last night.
Can't I have some privacy and quiet in my own home?"
"Charlie, we've got a problem with the accountants, they've
turned up a serious mess at Darby Turbine-"
I sat down on the unmade bed and told him about the limestone
scrubbers.
I suppose I expected an explosion: shouts of rage, galvanic action,
telephone calls, threats, decapitations ....
There was no reaction at all. He seemed to be listening, but his
eyes strayed back to the television screen.
"Charlie, you understand what this means? If [Pennypacker
Poole & Co.] doesn't give comfort, Harry Hatch [underwriters'
counsel] won't let the underwriters close, won't let them pay for the
Debentures, and that in turn means we can't merge with
Bromberg-"
"-and I can't pay off the banks," said Charlie, his voice like lead,
still staring at the silent football game. He understood, all right. I
waited.
After a long time he said: "It also means I'm a shitty manager, a
guy who doesn't know what's going on in his own companies." He
looked at me with an expression I'd never seen before. "It confirms
what you and a lot of other people have known for years-Conroy's
a big fraud, CCC's a house of cards."
"Now wait a second, Charlie-"
"A fucking house of cards! You know it better than anybody!
Bank debt, convertible debentures, stock trading at crazy
price-earnings ratios, earnings based on creative accounting...
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What's going to happen if I can't pay off the banks? You know what
those loan agreements say!" With that he sank back into the chair
and lit a cigarette, his hands shaking.
I'd never seen him like this. I knew he had his ups and downs, but
I couldn't believe this was the same man who soared to the skies last
night, who was going to buy Manayunk Steel, who was going to
build his tower sixty stories over Thirtieth Street Station-
"And you know it better than anybody," he said again, through a
cloud of cigarette smoke. "Charlie Conroy, the gardener's son who
had to wear patched knickers, who had to walk down to the road to
meet the school bus, whose father stank of cheap rye, whose mother
cried. And now he's a big shot! I can hear all of you laughing!"'
Ordway confronts this outburst of emotion with a combination of
reassurance and reason as he tries to get Charlie to face facts:
"Nobody's laughing at you, Charlie. You've built an empire with
your own energy, your own courage and brains, you've built yourself
an empire out of nothing, but every empire has troubles out along
the borders, and it's a long way from the emperor's palace to the
places where troubles develop, so you've got communications
problems. But when you see the trouble you've got to jump in and
deal with it. Now we have this mess down in West Virginia, it's no
use crying over it, we've got to decide what to do. We've got a
meeting with the underwriters in New York tomorrow. We've sent
for the engineers to explain the problem to everybody, but you're
going to have to be there, Charlie! They'll want to hear what you
plan to do about it."
He sat there and stared at the football game.
"I've done what I can, Charlie. I've told Renfrew to send the
Learjet out for the engineers. I've got our best people reviewing the
construction contract, to see if they can tell whose responsibility
those scrubbers are. I've arranged for the helicopter to take us to
New York first thing in the morning. But when we meet with the
underwriters they'll be looking at you! You're going to have to
convince them that you're on top of the situation."
"Never should have bought Darby. That's what changed
everything. If I was so damned smart, why did I go into hock to buy
Darby?"
"Charlie, you're stuck with Darby! You've got to deal with this
particular crisis tomorrow morning, and I've got to tell Bromberg
and Silverstone about it, right now before they find out from
somebody else. We've got to have them on our side in this, or the
whole house of cards really will collapse." I stood up. "Will you be
45. Solmssen, supra note 9, at 289-91.
2000] 1125
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ready at dawn? I want to see the engineers for an hour or so before
the underwriters have a go at them."
No answer.
"Charlie? Would you rather I go over first thing with Tommy
Sharp and send the chopper back for you and Bernard? I've got to
be there when Harry Hatch examines the engineers."
He stared at the football game, smoking a cigarette.
"Charlie?"
"What difference does it make? Do what you want, just leave me
alone."
I got up and left him alone and went downstairs to tell Bernard
Bromberg and Justin Silverstone about the limestone scrubbers.46
Alcohol clearly has affected Charlie's judgment and has reinforced
his detachment from problems in his business. This method of escape
makes reality that much harder to confront in the end. Although
Ordway manages to stay sober throughout the ordeal of the CCC
transaction, alcohol abuse is also a serious problem among lawyers,
perhaps even more so than among their clients.47 The effect of alcohol
on rational decision-making is an important topic to discuss in a
professional responsibility course, and Charlie's behavior is a good
example.
Later, at the closing, Charlie has sobered up but is still unwilling to
face facts.4 He hides from himself the irrationality of his own actions
by conflating, in his mind and in his rhetoric, the issues raised by the
crisis at hand with a different issue: his resentment of an insular
Philadelphia establishment that he perceives is trying to isolate him
and frustrate his success. When Charlie sees this hostile establishment
personified in his own lawyer, Ordway Smith, there is almost a
collapse of the communication that is critical to the success of their
relationship.
Ordway is simply trying to conform his own conduct to the rules of
professional responsibility and Charlie's conduct to the federal
securities laws. To Charlie, however, Ordway represents a "Main
Line" elite that judges people not by their conduct and
accomplishments, but by ancestry and whether money is "old" rather
than "new. '49 If success under the rules of Philadelphia Society is
defined by a listing in the Social Register, then perhaps Charlie is right
46. Id. at 291-92.
47. See Noonan & Painter, supra note 9, at 359-60 (discussing substance abuse in
the legal profession).
48. See Solmssen, supra note 9, at 322-25.
49. See id. at 323-24.
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to believe that these social rules are stacked against him, no matter
what he does. Charlie makes a profoundly illogical leap, however, in
reasoning that his own lawyer wants to undermine him and that
obeying the law-e.g., "play[ing] it your way"-puts him at a
disadvantage vis- -vis hostile elites who want to keep him in his
place.5" Charlie's observation of a social prejudice thus degenerates
into a belief that anyone who disagrees with him is against him and
that law is little more than a tool used by the elite to oppress people
like him."
Rationalization about law in its social context is important to
discuss in a professional responsibility course because illogical
conclusions can be drawn when bias, however real, is observed.5
2
People have prejudices and sometimes law reflects these prejudices,
but this does not mean that all of society's rules are instruments of
bias and oppression. Just as law professors who overemphasize the
assumption that people are "rational" can do their students a
disservice, law professors who assume that law is simply a tool for
powerful persons to oppress others can lead students down the same
road that Charlie's reasoning takes him-rationalization that
eventually becomes an excuse for breaking the law. Oversimplified
assumptions of this sort, even if useful for constructing theoretical
models in academic literature, need to be qualified by a healthy dose
of realism in the classroom, particularly in a course such as
professional responsibility.53
50. Id. at 324.
51. See id
52. Charlie's arguments reflect sentiments repeatedly expressed by persons of
perhaps more profound intellect. Former President Richard Nixon's sense of
persecution by a hostile "establishment" was a recurring theme both in his early
career and throughout Watergate. See, e.g., Abuse of Power, The New Nixon Tapes
373 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1997) (transcript of a recording of Nixon telling Henry
Kissinger on April 29, 1973: "And the man wh..... would be trusted by the so-called
damned establishment is Elliot Richardson."). This sense of persecution eventually
became an excuse for Nixon to ignore the ramifications of his refusal to obey the law.
Some thinkers on both the right and left have lent a seemingly sophisticated
theoretical touch to such rationalization by asserting that laws are primarily. if not
exclusively, instruments used by one dominant group to oppress others. See generally
Matthew W. Finkin, Quatsch!, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1681 (1999) (discussing how the
criticism of Western liberal orthodoxy by Carl Schmitt and other National Socialist
legal scholars fell on willing ears after Germany's humiliation at the hands of the
Allies in World War I, and how "law as oppression" arguments have again surfaced in
deconstructionist scholarship of the 1980's and 1990's).
53. This belief that law is a tool to oppress others stubbornly persists because it is
partially true-laws, including professional responsibility rules, are promulgated by
persons in power and sometimes are designed to perpetuate that power. See generally
Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in I Lawyers in
Society (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) (excerpted and discussed in
Noonan & Painter, supra note 9, at 753-61). However, law is a lot more. Law also
reflects the values of the society it governs-for example, there is a social consensus
that someone should not sell securities to the public without truthful disclosure and
that a lawyer should not assist a client in such conduct. See supra notes 1-7, 29 and
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B. Risk Taking in a Loss Frame or Gains Frame
Many judgment calls in the practice of law are essentially about
evaluating risk. In transactional work, it is thus important for lawyers
to understand how a person's risk assessment can be affected by
cognitive biases. Calculations of risk are affected by a person's frame
of reference.
According to prospect theory, which has been validated by
psychological studies, decision-makers tend to be risk-averse when
they believe they are deciding between two alternatives that can result
in a gain (a "gains frame"), but risk-preferring when they believe they
are deciding between two alternatives that can result in a loss (a "loss
frame").' For example, a person choosing between (a) receiving $10
and (b) having a one in three chance of receiving $30 is more likely to
take the $10, whereas someone choosing between (a) a sure $10 loss
and (b) a one in three chance of suffering a $30 loss is more likely to
take his chances. Thus, in the loss frame, reducing the probability of
loss altogether becomes the priority, even at the expense of increasing
one's exposure to a potentially greater loss. Numerous studies
confirm this bias; they show that the nature of a decision, or the
"frame" that casts it as a choice between gains or losses, is a critical
determinant of decisional outcomes.5 Expertise in the subject matter
of a decision does not mitigate this framing effect.56 Moreover, this
bias influences evaluations as well as decisions.5 1
Prospect theory thus predicts that plaintiffs will likely be risk-averse
when weighing settlement offers against their chances for even larger
gains in litigation, whereas defendants will likely be risk-preferring
when weighing the certain costs of a settlement offer against their
accompanying text. Persons who violate the law either reject some of those values or
subordinate them in importance to their own objectives. Teaching professional
responsibility solely from the "critical" view-that professional responsibility rules
are designed to preserve privilege within the bar rather than to promote professional
ethics-invites students later in life to indulge in the type of rationalization used by
Charlie Conroy to justify actions that amount to nothing more than selfish avoidance
or even violation of the law.
54. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. Risk & Uncertainty 297 (1992); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 Am. Psychologist 341,
342-44 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); see also John C. Hershey & J.H.
Schoemaker, Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses. An Expected
Utility Analysis, 47 J. Risk Ins. 111, 120-29 (1980) (offering additional empirical
support for Kahneman and Tversky's theory).
55. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 113, 124 (1996) (citing over a dozen studies confirming this cognitive bias
in monetary gambles, life threatening choices, purchasing decisions, and other
situations).
56. See id. at 124-25.
57. See id. at 125 n.52.
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chances for even larger liability in litigation.- This effect appears in
ethical risk taking as well. Taxpayers who owe money are more likely
to cheat on their taxes than those who expect a refund. 59 Similarly,
defense lawyers, who are told that litigation is going worse than their
clients' prior expectations, are more likely to cheat in discovery than
defense lawyers whose clients are pleased with better than expected
progress.6°
Prospect theory can also help predict circumstances where
participants in closing a transaction are likely to risk violating the
securities laws. In the early phases of a securities offering, when
disclosure documents are being prepared and deal participants
perceive themselves to be in a gains frame from the contemplated
transaction, deal participants are usually very cautious. Indeed,
lawyers often overstate legal risk when they advise their clients. 6' In
addition to risk aversion in the gains frame, rational incentives, social
norms, and other cognitive biases further push lawyers toward being
more conservative and unwilling to take risks.' Clients who view
themselves to be in a gains frame may also be prone to take this
advice and err on the side of caution in their disclosure documents.
58. See id at 128-30; see also Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. I11. L Rev. 43, 45 (discussing
Rachlinski's framing theory of litigation).
59. See Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 124 n.50 (citing Henry SJ. Robben et al.,
Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating: An International
Experimental Study, 11 J. Econ. Psychol. 341 (1990)).
60. See id at 142.
61. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. Li. 375, 379 (1997).
62. See id. at 377-78. Agency problems explain part of this risk aversion. See
Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs,
Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629, 655 (1997) ("A lawyer
loses far more by giving the go ahead to a course of action that is later subject to legal
sanction than she gains from advice that is not challenged. On the other hand, there
is frequently no reputational penalty from too much caution because the client lacks
the knowledge and expertise to second-guess the lawyer's judgment. In sum (and
subject to some predictable exceptions), lawyers are motivated to overstate legal
risk."). The importance of caution as a sociological norm of the legal profession could
also be a factor. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 61, at 413-19 (discussing
caution as a norm in the legal profession and the possibility that overstating legal risk
could be a technique to influence clients toward caution). Psychological biases also
might cause lawyers to overestimate risk. See id. at 423-26 (discussing "defensive
pessimism" or the tendency to over-weigh negative outcomes); id. at 426-28
(discussing "accountability" bias or the tendency toward caution when it is known
that the evaluation will itself likely be evaluated later); id. at 428-30 (discussing self-
interest-ego bias or the tendency to find risk when the evaluator benefits from its
presence). Other psychological biases, however, may cause a lawyer to underestimate
risk. Id. at 422-23 (discussing three such biases: "cognitive conservatism," which
causes people to ignore new law or facts contradicting a prior schema that is likely to
be constructed around the client's intended course of action; "commitment" bias,
which induces people to stick with a schema even in the face of adverse law or facts;
and bias toward overoptimism).
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Prospect theory, however, predicts that clients and other
participants in a closing, including investment bankers, accountants,
and lawyers, can get themselves into trouble once an endowment
effect builds up around the transaction, leading participants to believe
it is "theirs to lose" if the deal is called off.63 If bad news surfaces
shortly before the closing, risk-preferring behavior becomes more
likely, as demonstrated in National Student Marketing. It suddenly
becomes a no-win situation not only for the client, but also for the
investment bankers, who will probably lose their fees if the deal
collapses, as well as the lawyers, who may lose a client and possibly a
portion of their fees. Decision-making in such a loss frame is further
affected if decision-makers conceal risk-preferring behavior from
themselves by adjusting their estimates of risk artificially downwards
to make themselves believe they are making risk-neutral or risk-
averse decisions when, in fact, they are not.64 Lawyers, investment
bankers, or accountants who fall prey to this fallacy may convince
themselves that the facts or the law are different than they really are.
This is exactly what happened to the investment bankers and their
counsel at the CCC closing. Loss of the CCC deal would have put
First Hudson in the red for the year,65 a result they were loath to live
with even though the alternative of closing the sale of the debentures
without changing the prospectus would have exposed them to the
even worse fate of being sued by the purchasers. 66 "Rational"
underwriters in these circumstances presumably should be risk-averse
because federal securities laws impose on underwriters liability up to
the full amount of the offering, 67 even though they may only take a
fraction of the proceeds of the offering in commissions. "Rationality,"
however, does not prevail with First Hudson or their counsel. In
anticipation of the substantial fee from closing the deal, Harry Hatch
and his underwriter clients evaluate the deal in a loss frame in which
the underwriting fee could disappear.' Consequently, they view the
risks in the deal a lot more favorably than does Ordway:
63. Once again, other cognitive biases may also come into play. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75, 101-11 (1993) (positing that
lawyers may not be good monitors of their client's conduct because they are
motivated by a number of biases to see their client's activities as permissible).
64. See Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 134-35 (discussing how subjects in litigation
settlement negotiation simulation studies overestimate their chances of winning and
therefore perceive their own risk-preferring reservation prices to be risk-averse)
(citing George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. Legal Stud. 135 (1993)).
65. See Solmssen, supra note 9, at 325.
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
67. Id.
68. It is not clear that Harry Hatch's firm would necessarily have lost its legal fee
if the First Hudson underwriters lost their underwriting fee. Nevertheless, because
underwriters often use the same outside law firm to represent them on many
transactions, the lawyers representing them may identify strongly with the interests of
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Harry Hatch's first reaction had been an icy stare: "I take it you
know something we don't?"
"No, you have all the facts we have, Harry. I'm just drawing a
different conclusion."
69
Fortunately, the accountants and Ordway remain risk-averse,70 either
because they have not built up an endowment effect in their minds
around the pending transaction or because they are able for other
reasons to overcome cognitive bias towards taking risk in a loss frame.
The lesson from this story for a professional responsibility class is
clear: a lawyer who understands that judgment can be affected by
frames of reference-such as whether a decision-maker believes
himself to be in a gains frame or a loss frame-should be able to
recognize situations in which frames of reference change, and to
evaluate more critically both his own and other people's judgments.
C. Other Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases other than risk preferences can contribute to an
issuer's concealment of material information from investors." These
biases may become more entrenched in people's minds as the closing
approaches. Professor Langevoort has observed, for example, that
"cognitive conservatism and decision simplification" can lead
decision-makers to develop simplified explanations of occurrences, or
"schemas," that tend to resist change?3 This tendency, as illustrated
by The Comfort Letter, is exacerbated in group settings where stress
comes from challenging commonly held beliefs.' Once Darby
Turbine's officers convince themselves that the limestone scrubbers
are going to work, it becomes difficult for them to change their minds.
In the group setting around the closing table, there is enormous
the underwriters, thus increasing their "commitment" bias to their clients. See
generally Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 61, at 422-23; Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L Rev. 101 (1997) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Organized Illusions] (discussing commitment bias). Furthermore, in
some cases the law firm may have an informal understanding with their underwriter
clients that they will write off a substantial portion of their fee in unsuccessful deals in
return for charging a premium in deals that are successful.
69. Solmssen, supra note 9, at 325.
70. See id. at 282, 325.
71. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 68, at 157.
72. Id. at 135-39.
73. Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Managerial Response to Changing Environments:
Perspectives on Problem Sensing from Social Cognition, 27 Admin. Sci. Q. 548, 549
(1982); Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 68, at 135-39, 136 n.118 (citing
Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed
Opportunities, 11 J. Bus. Ethics 379 (1992) (discussing how Ford Motor's product-
recall personnel missed danger signs associated with the Pinto's on-road performance
because of a "normalcy" schema that refused to admit that there were problems with
the car's design)).
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pressure to affirm Darby Turbine's confidence in the technology, and
to dismiss dissenters, such as Alex Morrisson, Darby's chief engineer,
as disgruntled complainers.74
Another phenomena pointed out by Professor Langevoort is
"overoptimism," or the tendency of organizations to promote an
optimistic frame of reference in order to promote hard work and long-
term commitment by employees, even though this mindset deflects or
rationalizes evidence of negative developments." Although much of
what entrepreneurs believe about themselves and their businesses
may in fact be myths, some of the entrepreneur's "success may
actually be due to the presence of such myths and illusions."76 Charlie
apparently used over-optimism to inspire subordinates when he built
his business empire from a nearly bankrupt sheet and tube company,
and he now tries to use that same strategy to bluff his away out of his
present difficulty:
I returned just as the second act began. Charlie Conroy, Bernard
Bromberg and Justin Silverstone were at the table now, and the
underwriters were crowding back into the room.
"All right, is the fire out?" demanded Charlie. He seemed
completely recovered. 77
Every person in the room, except Ordway and the accountants,
appears to have joined Charlie in rationalizing or deflecting the bad
news, and is ready to close.7' While over-optimism is a useful tool for
building confidence and enhancing performance in a business, 79 it has
a dark side that should be recognized-over-optimism has the
potential to distort good judgment in the face of suddenly learned and
decidedly negative facts.
Decision-makers are also vulnerable to "commitment" bias. Once
people make a commitment to a person or course of conduct, they
may consistently adhere to that commitment even if later confronted
with facts suggesting that the commitment is a bad choice.8" This
74. Jack Renfrew: "Shoulda gotten rid of [Alex Morrisson] years ago.... Alex is
a holdover from the old gang, from before Charlie got control, he's got a chip on his
shoulder because other people have been put on top of him, and underneath him
too." Solmssen, supra note 9, at 283.
75. Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 68, at 139-41, 140 nn.133 & 135
(citing Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Optimism 100-12 (1991), and Edward J. Zajac
& Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots for Industry and Competitor Analysis: Implications
of Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic Decisions, 16 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 37 (1991)).
76. Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1569, 1581 (2000) [hereinafter Langevoort, Myths] ("Myth-making
is stable in an evolutionary sense even among the 'fittest."').
77. Solmssen, supra note 9, at 300.
78. See id. at 322-23.
79. Langevoort, Myths, supra note 76, at 1581.
80. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 68, at 142-43,142 n.142 (citing
Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 Acad. Mgmt.
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behavior is demonstrated by the underwriters, their counsel Harry
Hatch, and Charlie, who have all committed themselves to completing
the debenture offering, despite the fact that they may be violating
federal securities laws. Ordway is committed to Charlie, his client,
and Charlie appeals to this commitment in his attempt to persuade
Ordway to go along with closing.81 Ordway, however, stands firm in
not allowing this commitment to sway his judgment.-
When there is sufficient ambiguity in a situation, people also may
sometimes infer "self-serving facts" that do not threaten their self-
esteem or career prospects.83 Charlie's self-esteem, ever threatened
by the snobbishness of Philadelphia's elite, seems to depend on his
closing this deal. The underwriters' self-esteem also seems to depend
on the deal, which will determine their year-end bonuses.
Fortunately, Ordway's self-esteem is distanced enough from this
transaction that he can view the "self-serving facts" professed by the
others for what they are.
It is important to remember that in a closing for a major
transaction, these biases, when they appear, do so against a
background of considerable stress. Lack of sleep in the days leading
up to a closing is common, particularly for the more junior lawyers
and investment bankers. This stress and fatigue, coupled with
cognitive biases, may further cloud the judgments of the participants
in the deal.
IV. COMFORT ON A CONTINGENCY?
The Comfort Letter also provides a good opportunity to discuss with
a professional responsibility class how compensation arrangements
affect people's incentives and judgments. The different ethical rules
imposed on auditors and lawyers with respect to compensation
arrangements reflect the different roles of these two professions in
transactions. The particular compensation arrangement chosen among
the range of ethically permissible alternatives, however, can also
influence how these roles are carried out.
Rev. 577, 584 (1981)).
81. Charlie remarks:
We run into a few problems and the Messrs. Conyers & Dean develop
cold feet. Oh, they don't mind collecting two or three hundred grand in fees
every year, even from the gardener's son-it's all money, after all-but when
we get down to the nitty-gritty, when the client really has his balls in the
wringer, then Messrs. Conyers & Dean suddenly develop very high ethics-.
Solmssen, supra note 9, at 323.
82. See id.
83. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 68, at 143.46, 144 n.149 (citing
Dennis A. Gioia, Self-Serving Bias as a Self-Sensemaking Strategy: Explicit vs. Tacit
Impression Management, in Impression Management in the Organization 219,230-33
(Robert A. Giacalone & Paul Rosenfeld eds., 1989)).
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Auditors are prohibited from charging a contingent feel-an
arrangement that could invite auditors to look the other way when
problems of the sort uncovered at Darby Turbine arise. In order to
earn the fee, some auditors would be tempted to provide a comfort
letter despite their lack of comfort with the transaction. Although
liability under § 11 of the 1933 Act should encourage auditors to think
twice before providing false comfort in a registered offering, 85 the
SEC and the auditing profession have both expressly rejected
contingent-fee arrangements for auditors.s6
Perverse incentives from an ownership interest are not as powerful
as those from a contingency fee, because it would be more difficult for
auditors with an ownership interest to take their money and run.
Nonetheless, auditors are still prohibited from having an ownership
interest in their clients.' While the auditor-owner would usually
suffer with the other stockholders if material information were
concealed, an auditor's ownership interest in a client might not
coincide perfectly with the interests of other shareholders. For
example, auditors might accept securities with different liquidation,
dividend, or voting rights than the securities an issuer sells to the
public, or they might sell their shares before other investors are told
about a problem in the issuer's financial statements.88 Such
84. Auditors who certify an issuer's books and records may not be compensated
by contingent fees. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
Code of Profl Conduct R. 302.01, at http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et302.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2000). The AICPA Rule defines a contingent fee as "a fee established
for the performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be
charged unless a specified finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the
fee is otherwise dependent upon the finding or result of such service." Id. In addition,
the SEC has proposed rules that extend this prohibition to contingent fees paid to the
auditors' firm for other services. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence
Requirements, SEC Release Nos. 33-7870, 34-42994, 35-27193,2000 SEC LEXIS 1389
(June 30, 2000) Proposed rule 2-01(c)(5) states that an accountant is not independent
under the SEC's standard if the accountant provides any service to an audit client or
an affiliate of an audit client for a contingent fee. Id.
85. Auditors are specifically mentioned in § 11 as potential defendants with
respect to the portions of the registration statement for which they are responsible,
namely the audited financial statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1997).
86. See supra note 84.
87. Such an ownership interest is perceived to destroy the independence of an
accountant with respect to the client. See Codification of Financial Reporting Policies
§ 602.02(b), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,258, at 62,886 (1988); AICPA Codification
of Statements on Auditing Standards No. 1, AU § 220.03 ("[A]n auditor with a
substantial financial interest in a company might be unbiased in expressing his
opinion on the financial statements of the company, but the public would be reluctant
to believe that he was unbiased."); see also Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements, SEC Release Nos. 33-7870, 34-42994, 35-27193, supra
note 84 (proposing clarification of SEC rules on ownership interests in clients held by
partners of auditing firms).
88. If the auditors were caught, they might be liable for insider trading if they
knew about the problem when they sold their shares. See generally Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release Nos. 33,7881, 34-43154, 2000 WL
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temptations are too great for the SEC and the auditing profession to
feel comfortable with, even though an equity stake, unlike a
contingent fee, might align the auditors' financial interests more
closely with those of the investors who purchase securities in a public
offering.89
In sharp contrast, lawyers are permitted to earn compensation from
clients under a wide range of arrangements. Lawyers, for example,
can take an ownership interest in a client, either in lieu of, or in
addition to, a cash fee.9 Today, both practices are increasingly
common.91 Indeed, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility recently approved of equity-in-lieu-of-
cash fee arrangements in a Formal Opinion. - Such arrangements
must be "fair and reasonable" under Model Rule 1.5, and the stock
ownership must not sway the lawyer's independent judgment in
advising the client under Model Rule 2.1. 91 Both standards, however,
are so subjective that they are difficult to enforce.
It is uncertain how an equity stake in a client may affect a lawyer's
judgment, if at all. If Ordway had an equity stake in CCC, he might
have been tempted to go ahead with the closing on the theory that
selling the debentures was good for CCC's shareholders because the
debenture holders would take on undisclosed, and hence
uncompensated, risk. Such an approach, however, would be
shortsighted because a subsequent lawsuit from the debenture holders
for securities fraud probably would have done more damage to CCC's
share price than cancellation of the debenture offering. Alternatively,
an equity stake in CCC might have made Ordway even more likely to
stand up to Charlie's irrational decision-making. Finally, regardless of
his equity stake, Ordway might have observed Model Rule 2.1 and not
allowed his personal stake in CCC to affect his independent judgment
on behalf of his client.
1239722, 2000 WL 1201556 (Aug. 15, 2000) (final rules effective Oct. 23, 2000)
(promulgating Rule 10b5-1, which imposes liability on insiders who trade while in
"knowing possession" of material nonpublic information).
89. See supra note 87.
90. See generally Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?: Law firms
investing in hot high-tech IPOs are making a fortune, but some critics worry the stock
craze is clouding ethics matters, 86 A.B.A. J. 36 (Feb. 2000).
91. See id.
92. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000);
see also Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.7(b) (1987) [hereinafter Model
Rules] ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless... the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected ... [and] the client consents after
consultation." (emphasis added)).
93. Model Rules, supra note 92, R. 2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.")
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Lawyers also may take a legal fee that is contingent upon closing.94
Until recently, contingent fees were charged primarily in litigation by
lawyers representing plaintiffs, a practice that has generated
considerable controversy.95 In the 1980's, "performance fees" based
in part on outcome became more common in mergers and
acquisitions.96 The New York law firm Cravath Swaine & Moore
broke new ground in 1999 when it charged a $35 million fee to Time
Warner, contingent upon the successful closing of Time Warner's
merger with AOL. 7 Although the fee arrangement, negotiated by
Time Warner's General Counsel, a former Cravath associate,
compensated Cravath for a portion of the time billed by its associates
regardless of results, the lion's share of Cravath's fee depended upon
the merger successfully closing.98
To anyone who has read The Comfort Letter, the risk inherent in
contingent-fee-for-closing arrangements is obvious. The contingent
fee gives the lawyer an enormous incentive to cave in to client
pressure and close the deal regardless of the consequences. As
already pointed out, CCC's investment bankers viewed the risks
inherent in the transaction more favorably than Ordway, and there is
a reason why:
94. See id. R. 1.5(c) ("A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for
which the service is rendered.").
95. See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625 (1995) (describing
the incentives that can arise out of a contingent fee arrangement and the prospect of
overcharging); Richard W. Painter, The New American Rule: A First Amendment to
the Client's Bill of Rights, Civ. Just. Rep. 1 (March 2000), at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/cjr_l.htm (recommending that contingent-fee lawyers be required to
choose for each case, and then disclose to the client a dollars-per-hour limit on how
high the contingent fee can go).
96. See Daniel Hertzberg & James B. Stewart, Contingency Legal Fee for Merger
Breaks Ground, Stirs Controversy, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 31 (discussing
"performance fee" charged by Wachtell Lipton and Skadden Arps).
97. See Krysten Crawford & Karen Hall, High Rollers, Am. Law., Feb. 2000, at 19;
Krysten Crawford & Karen Hall, A OL-Time Warner Merger A Big Gamble for Firm,
The Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 21, 2000, at 4.
98. According to the New York Law Journal:
The $35 million is all-inclusive, said one person familiar with the fee
arrangement; it covers "everything touching getting this deal done." There
is one exception. While no partner time-neither litigation nor corporate-
will be paid if the deal dies, Cravath negotiated a cushion that allows it to
recover fees for associates' time spent on document production. Cravath has
agreed not to bill Time Warner for the first $1 million of work on the deal.
Beyond that and up to $5 million, Time Warner will pay half of the
associates' billings. Associate hours spent on document production in excess
of $5 million will be paid in full. That could cover thousands of billable
hours spent producing documents in connection with regulatory filings as
well as shareholder suits. "What that tells me," said one M&A expert, "is
that Cravath was not willing to assume the risk of an eternal battle."
Krysten Crawford & Karen Hall, Cravath's $35 Million Fee Wager; Time Warner
M&A on Contingency, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 20,2000, at 1.
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Every eye in the room focused on me. The Frenchman had his
sunglasses on again, but it seemed to me that I could see his eyes
right through them.
One of the brokers, sotto voce: "That's the bailgame. We're in the
red for sixty-nine. Bye-bye bonus."
"Bye-bye Conroy," whispered his neighbor.9
One can only imagine the pressure that Ordway would have been
under to "shut up and close" had he stood to lose not only CCC as a
client but also a multimillion-dollar contingent fee.
CONCLUSION
The Comfort Letter is an excellent introduction to the business and
legal issues, as well as the psychological pressures, that can accompany
a closing. While CCC may not be the typical issuer, nor Charlie the
typical client, issuers and the people who manage them often are not
"typical." Each closing will bring its own issues to the table. Lawyers
who have been taught in law school and later in law practice to think
for themselves, and who try to understand as much as possible how
other people think, are well positioned to successfully anticipate and
confront important issues in a closing before they become crises.
99. Sohnssen, supra note 9, at 325.
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